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I.

Introduction.

This paper presents a description and analysis of the telephone privatization and
consequent deregulation process that has taken place in the Argentine Republic over the
last ten years. The privatization of ENTel (Empresa National de Telecomunicaciones, the
public nationwide telephone company) brought about great changes in the industry as

JD Universidad del Salvador (Buenos Aires, Argentina); attended Southwestern University
School of Law (Los Angeles, California). The author has worked for the law firm of Marval,
O'Farrell & Mairal (Buenos Aires, Argentina) in the telecommunications section. He has also
been published in La Ley (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 12/30/99) and is currently a consultant on
issues dealing with foreign investment in Argentina. The author appreciates the contributions
of Mr. Diego Armesto, Mr. Carlos Bentolila, Ms. Susana Solis, and Ms. Alicia Solis.
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well as the creation of new regulatory agencies. It also meant that the state would put the
provision of telephone service into private ownership selected by means of an international public bid; the management and assets would be transferred to the private sector
while the regulation and control of the industry would remain on the governmental
level.
In order to convey just how fundamental a change this was for the industry this
paper will briefly focus on the state of the industry up to 1989 and then explore in detail
the legal framework and regulatory agencies created for implementing such a radical
change. It will then continue with some relevant data on new services implemented,
investment amounts, lines installed, etc. Finally, the paper will briefly discuss the deregulation of the local, long distance, and international telephone service provision.

II.

ENTel-The Former National Telecommunications Company.

Argentina's telecommunications industry dates back to the year 1881, when a Swiss
company laid the first telephone lines in downtown Buenos Aires. Towards the middle
of the century, however, a local subsidiary of The International Telephone and Telegraph
Corporation (ITT), the American-owned Uni6n Telef6nica del Rio de La Plata,' was
operating the service until Juan D. Per6n 2 declared its nationalization. A newborn state
company, ENTel, was created as a symbol of the Peronist government's nationalization
process, which also included the railroads, mail service, and energy. 3 From that point,
ENTel managed to secure a legal monopoly throughout most of Argentina.' No licenses
were granted to private enterprises. The only other companies operating (on a very small
scale) were CAT' and a number of small "cooperative" structures, all in regions where
ENTel was not present.'
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

H. LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ARGENTINE CAPITALIsM, 51, 56 (1990). The American-owned
Uni6n Teleft6nica del Rio de La Plata originally had been built with British capital.
Argentina's President from 1946-1955 and from 1973-1974.
See Lewis, supra note 1, at 160 (".... the state was creating new public enterprises in a number of fields. According to William Glade, Per6n's expansion of government ownership of
industry 'was perhaps unequalled in Latin America until the Castro regime was installed in
Cuba.' In addition to YPF, Gas del Estado, and the state merchant marine fleet, which were
all inherited from past administrations, the public sector came to include the railroads, which
were purchased from Britain and France; the telephone system; a river fleet, bought from
the Dodero Steamship Line; most of the nation's waterworks and electrical power plants;
some coalfields discovered in southern Patagonia; an airline company; and a heterogeneous
conglomerate called DINIE (Direcci6n Nacional de Industrias del Estado), formed in 1947
from several expropriated Axis properties. DINIE owned ten metallurgical plants that produced goods ranging from machinery and steel storage drums to diesel motors and surgical
equipment; four electrical equipment companies; four textile mills; nine firms producing
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, or agricultural chemicals; five industrial chemicals plants; four
construction and engineering companies; and two import-export firms.").
Id. at 193 ("The United River Plate Telephone Company, an ITT subsidiary, was acquired for
$95 million.").
Compafia Argentina de Tel~fonos S.A.
PAUL

MARCELO CELLANI, DETERMINANTES DE LA INVERSION EN TELECOMUNICACIONES EN ARGENTINA

(1998).
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The main problems that ENTel faced were those encountered in other Argentine
nationalized companies: non-professional management that was highly dependent on
political objectives. Compounding this, there was almost no allocation of resources
devoted to the maintenance or renewal of the network's infrastructure. During this
period, developed countries had embraced new technologies such as digital (mobile and
fixed) telecommunications services while Argentina counted on fifty-year-old manual
switchboards. These reasons along with a lack of long-term governmental policies caused
the company to offer only highly inefficient services. 7 The military government (19761983) did nothing to change ENTel's situation.'
For example, during the early and mid-1980s getting a phone line installed in
Argentina qualified as an "impossible" mission. 9 Phone lines became so valuable that
they greatly influenced real estate. In Argentina's capital, Buenos Aires, a two-bedroom
apartment would be marked up 10 to 15 percent if it had an existing telephone line.
These inefficiencies not only resulted in a limitation of telephone service but also
opened the door to corruption. The fact is that if someone knew whom to contact high
enough in the company's management he or she could be among the privileged to have
a phone for U.S. $2,000. This figure varied depending on the number of employees
required to set up the line after getting through their own red tape. Although no "official"
source exists to prove these types of transactions, these schemes were well known to a
great number of Argentines during the 1980s.
During 1986-1987, some politicians in the Radical party (in office during that
time)'" proposed bringing in Telef6nica de Espafia's professional management team to
run ENTel while keeping the company under a state-controlled regime. This project
never materialized.
Toward 1989, ENTel was submerged in a state of financial chaos due to the abandonment of its lines, switchboards, commercial practices, and lack of investment. The
company's debt represented 60 percent of its assets. Some analysts estimate that ENTeI's
debt doubled because the government had eliminated subsidies, causing the company to
finance its negative balances by acquiring new debt. Many of ENTel's negative numbers

7.

8.

9.
10.

See Lewis, supra note 1, at 491 ("Since 1967 ENTel has failed to get its accounts approved

by the Accounting Office for Public Enterprises (Sindicatura General de Empresas Pfiblicas).
Meanwhile, more than 60 percent of the telephone network is either obsolete or out of
order .... ").
Id. at 455-56 ("For the most part, the military resisted the idea of privatization. Efficiency was
only one factor they considered. National security dictated that certain kinds of production
and services had to be guaranteed. It also indicated a need for developing the poorer regions
of the interior, which might be done through locating branches of the state enterprises there.
Finally, the armed services were worried that a high rate of unemployment might create
opportunities for the guerilla Left to infiltrate the labor movement; therefore, the military put
a higher priority on maintaining full employment than on reducing economic costs. Indeed
they even insisted in some cases on adding to the state enterprise sector. In 1979 they forced
the government to purchase the Swiss-owned Compafiia Italo-Argentina de Electricidad for
$93 million, and in 1980 they forced the acquisition of Austral, a private airline company
servicing the interior of the country.").
Id. at 491 ("... and it often takes ten years or more to have a telephone installed.").
Raul Alfonsin was President of Argentina from 1983-1989.
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were also due to the enormous amount of litigation brought against it for breach of contract and labor-related disputes." This was the general state of ENTel before it became
private.

III.

A New Beginning: Law No. 23.696 (State Reformation).
In July 1989, Carlos S. Menem became President of the Argentine Republic. 2 It
was a time of political and social turmoil. Inflation was at 5000 percent annually and
social problems spilled onto the streets of Buenos Aires as supermarket sackings took
place. Radical changes in the structure of the Argentine economy were needed; President
Menem stated, "emergency surgery without anesthesia was required." The government
wanted to send a clear message to the Argentines and to the rest of the world: Argentina
wanted to become a nation that had a free market economy and to leave behind the
"elephant state" concept of public ownership of utilities. Menem needed the backing of
the Argentine Congress and during the first days of his first term he enacted two critical
pieces of legislation: Law 23.696 (State Reformation) and Law 23.928 (Convertibility).
The "Convertibility Law" basically pegs the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar on a
one-to-one basis. For every peso in circulation there is one dollar in Argentina's Central
Bank that will "back it up" No printing of pesos can be authorized unless it has a
matching dollar deposit.
The second crucial law from 1989 is known as the "Reform of the State" Law. It
marks a specific turning point in over fifty years of Argentine policy geared toward stateowned, state-run, deficit-accumulating companies. First, the law declared the emergency
situation of the public administration (which included its companies). Second, the law
mandated that privatization of enterprises must be declared by the executive power and
must be approved by the Congress. However, it also singled out a few companies for
privatization
in a corresponding annex. The first company to be listed in the annex was
3
ENTel.'
This law provided the green light for the Argentine government to begin its new
role in the restructuring of the country's telephone service. The privatization of ENTel
was the first major sign from the government favoring the introduction of private capital
through direct investment. During this period, most analysts seemed to agree that the
Argentine telecommunications industry was underdeveloped and that its growth potential was enormous. They were correct.

IV. Presidential Decree 62/90-International Bid for the
Privatization of the Public Telecommunications Service.
The Decree established the major legal, geographic, and economic criteria to be
applied in the pre-selection and selection of the companies that are to be granted the

11.

See Cellani, supra note 6.

12.
13.

President of Argentina from 1989-1999.
National Telecommunications Company.
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two licenses to provide telephone service. It also contained the rights and obligations of
the contracting parties.
The choice of direct privatization instead of other alternatives (such as concessions)
was made after the government concluded that the best method would be to limit its
own intervention as much as possible. In addition, private enterprise was more interested
in keeping the capital it would have to put down. For these two reasons, it was decided
that management as well as property would be transferred to the private sector.
Presidential Decree 60/90 previously created two separate companies before the
actual international "calling" for potential interested parties in order to facilitate the transition from public to private ownership by transferring the stock in these to the companies that would be selected in the bid. The two companies were "Norte S.A:' and
"Sur S.A.' The government divided the country and the A.M.B.A. (Buenos Aires Multiple
Area) into two parts. Each of these "parts" was similar in size and would be transferred
to the company eventually selected to run telephone service provision in it. So, one
company would run the service in the northern area of Argentina and another would
operate in the southern area. Each one of these regions presented sub-regions with the
following situation:
(1) Areas in which ENTel or CAT was providing telephone service.
(2) Areas in which the service was provided by small cooperatives.
(3) Areas in which no service was being provided.
For the provision of international telecommunications service, a third company
"Telintar" (SPSI)' 4 was created, which would be run and divided equally between the
two selected companies.
As for the decree itself, the first point to be made is that the government viewed as
of vital importance to ensure that certain "operational goals" of the system be assured.
These goals required strong initial investments. Due to this fact, it was decided that
a "temporal exclusivity period" would be awarded. Once this period had come to an
end, telephone service would enter a "competition" era. In other words, the transition
produced is from a permanent state monopoly to a temporary private exclusiveness that
would finally lead to competition.'5
The decree established two types of licenses in order to operate telephone and telephone related services in the Argentine Republic: 6 Licenses under an exclusivity regime
and licensees under a competition regime.
A.

LICENSES UNDER AN EXCLUSIVITY REGIME.

Each of the two companies (one for the north and the other for the south of the
country and the A.M.B.A. 7 ) and the SPSI (international phone service provider made
up of the two licensees'") shall be granted an exclusive license to operate the following
services:
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

".... sociedad an6nima titular del Servicio Internacional (SPSI)"; taken from Presidential
Decree 62/90.
As this article shall later explain, total competition began on November 9, 2000; however,
competition between four carriers had already begun a year earlier (October 10, 1999).
This was the system during the years of temporary private exclusiveness.
Buenos Aires Multiple Area.
Telintar S.A.
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(1) Local and long distance service (each of the two selected companies will have
an exclusive license to operate this type of service in its established area of the
country).
(2) International phone service (an exclusive license to the SPSI).
These licenses, under the exclusivity regime, shall be granted for a period of five
years counted from two years after possession is granted. Thus, each company would
have an exclusive license for a total of seven years (beginning in November 1990). The
initial two-year period was established as a timeframe for the selected companies to
organize and coordinate between themselves in order to provide their services. The decree
provides an eventual three-year extension on this exclusivity regime if certain goals are
achieved and accepted by the regulatory agency.
This method of granting licenses finds constitutional backing in article 75.18 of the
Argentine Constitution. This article establishes that these types of temporal "privileges"
can be granted to provide for the prosperity and progress of the country.
B. LICENSES UNDER A COMPETITION REGIME.
The SSEC' 9 shall provide the telecommunication services (under the competitive
regime) established under Section 9.11, which are: national telex, national data (ARPAC),
mobile maritime, and other services to be determined (in all of the Argentine territory).
Through the SSEC, or other separate corporations, the licensees shall conduct all
their business and activities dealing with the telecommunication services allowed under
the competition regime. The SSEC shall be granted a "competition regime" license in
order to offer these services.
Once the exclusive license period ends, the companies may be granted licenses to
provide services under the current competition regime as well as their original services
outside their regions (Section 13.7.1). The most important part of this section is that
new licenses may be granted to other carriers to provide telephone service in any part of
the country.20 The decree also specifically states that the licensees (under the exclusivity
regime) must provide access to the network by interconnecting when asked by another
carrier.
1. Prerequisites.
The decree established several prerequisites that had to be met by the interested
companies. The most important ones were:
*
*

19.

Pay $20,000 U.S. dollars to purchase the terms and conditions of the bid, and
Offer an amount to be paid upon taking possession. The base price must be
paid in cash and the excess amount in Argentine external debt bonds.

"Sociedad que preste los Servicios en Competencia (SSEC)"; taken from Presidential Decree
62/90.

20.

Full deregulation began on November 9, 2000; however, the exclusivity period came to a
partial end when competition between four carriers began on October 10, 1999.
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2. Rights and Obligations.
The decree includes all the rights and obligations of the licensees. It is a very extensive and complex legal as well as technical work. The most important aspects concerning
the rights and obligations of the parties involved include:
(1) Stock holdings of the acquiring company shall always amount to at least 51
percent of the total stock of the company for which it was granted its license
unless otherwise authorized by the corresponding regulatory authority.
(2) Licensees are authorized to make public offerings of their company's stock once
they have been granted possession.
(3) Licensees do not take on any of ENTel's liabilities, except:
(a) Those contracts that, although having been agreed upon by ENTeI, are still
being fulfilled.
(b) Certain detailed collective bargaining agreements.
(c) Employment obligations derived from the labor laws and social security
laws except any current claims under litigation or payments that have been
approved by the date of the transfer to the licensee.
"Basic Telephone Service" is defined in this decree as "the provision of the fixed
telecommunications loops that form part of the public telephone network or that are
connected to such network and the provision by those means of local, long distance
and international service by means of 'live voice.'" In other words, in order to be able
to access the service, one must be connected to the carrier's telephone networks. The
consumer shall achieve this by means of a "service provision contract" and the payment
of a connection fee.
All of the services that are not included in this definition shall be provided on a
"competitive regime" from the moment that the licensees take possession (section 8.5).
Such services include: cellular (with some restrictions), national telex, national data, and
mobile maritime data.
The obligations of the licensees are described in Section 10. The main obligation is to
provide basic telephone service. However, the government also wanted to make sure that
a general expansion and better overall efficiency of the telephone net was guaranteed.
The following are a few examples.
Each company is required to ensure that it maintain the service on "continuous,
general, and equal terms." Companies are also required to meet all the technical and
access requirements for the regulatory agencies to be able to carry out their functions.
As will be discussed in section VI of this paper, a specific telephone service provider
regulatory agency was a new concept for existing Argentine regulation.
Two other important obligations relate to specific parameters regarding the amount
of public telephone service in each sub-region, and to the requirement that a provider
may not disconnect any area from the national satellite service under any circumstances.
Some services were established as free of charge, such as emergency numbers (police,
fire station, ambulances, white page listings, phone book distribution, and directory
assistance).
Interconnection was also an important issue. Section 10.4 establishes that companies
(including the SPSI and SSEC) must interconnect according to the established procedures
of the regulatory authority in order to guarantee the continuity, expansion, and quality
of the service. The demands of interconnection must be met on a non-discriminatory
basis and the prices to interconnect shall be non-discriminatory and published. Once
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the "exclusivity period" is over, the SPSI must also interconnect on a non-discriminatory
basis with the carriers providing additional local, long distance, and international telephone service that shall enter the deregulated competitive market. 2
Section 10.6 establishes that cross subsidies2 2 are prohibited: "The licensees are prohibited from utilizing income derived from their Basic Telephone Service operations to
subsidize the services provided under a competitive basis." It is important to note that
some services were permitted to be provided through the SSEC on a competitive basis
during the exclusivity period of basic telephone service provision.
Section 10.7 states that all type of conflicts that may arise between the licensees
regarding the provision of telephone service shall be resolved by the regulatory authority.
Section 9 of the decree deals with the services provided by SPSI (currently Telintar).
This company, which is to be operated and owned equally by both companies obtaining the licenses, shall provide the international telephone service during the period of
exclusivity. Once this period ends, this service shall be provided on a competitive basis.
3. Mandatory Goals.
The government made sure that certain goals of its telecommunications policy were
established as legal obligations for the new companies. The goals provided benchmarks
for certain numbers of installed phone lines or percentages of phone line installations
to be increased within fixed time frames. These were the "mandatory goals" under
section 10.1.8.1. The most important were:
(1) Telephone network expansion by means of new line installation.
(2) Efficiency in calls defined as "efficiency in completing local calls within each
region; efficiency in completing long distance calls within each region; and
efficiency in completing international calls."
(3) Efficiency related to the time to complete inquiries by subscribers, telephone
repairs, operator assistance with long distance or international calls in those
areas that required it.
(4) Decreased average time to install a new telephone line.
4. Rate Regulation.
Probably one of the most important sections of the decree is Section 12 dealing with
rate regulation. The main premise, according to the government, was for the licensees to
reduce the rates in basic service in relation to the inflation during the exclusivity period.
This was to be achieved through a method that would also establish a reasonable return
for a company operating in an efficient manner. After this, the rates could fluctuate

21.

See

22.

provisions in this regard are sections 251 and 252, which impose "interconnection" duties
on incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs).").
Id. at 400: ("... Cross-subsidization, which occurs when one group of customers pays part

THOMAS G. KRATENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 427 (1998) ("The
(U.S.A's) Telecommunications Act of 1996 radically revised prior law by insisting that regulation be designed to stimulate competition among wired carriers in the "local loop." The key

of the cost of providing service to another group.").
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according to the change in the monthly consumer price index. The licensees were also
given the right to adjust the rates after 6, 12, 18, and 24 months after taking possession.
This period was to be known as the "Transition Period." This adjustment would end
up amounting to a 16 percent rate of return, having been approved by the regulatory
authority.
Once the transition period ended and the exclusivity period began the licensees were
required to reduce their rates on a 2 percent annual basis. This was a fundamental clause
that had to be met in order to obtain access to the three-year extension on the exclusivity
period (Section 12.4.1-2). They also had to demonstrate that the residential rates had
increased in a "less accelerated rhythm" (taken from the legal text) than inflation during
the exclusivity period.
If the companies were able to meet the goals to obtain the three-year extension on
their exclusivity period they would then have to further reduce their rates by 4 percent
per year (done by taking the previous year as a parameter and applying the monthly
consumer price index).
Some changes in the system of rate regulation came about in November 1991, when
the licensees entered into an agreement with the government whereby telephone rates
would be based on the U.S. dollar and would be adjusted on a semester basis according
to the Consumer Price Index of the United States.
In February 1992, another agreement was signed by which rates were dollarized. The
result of this was that the "pulse" (unit of measurement used for telecommunications)
was fixed at $0.0391 U.S. dollars. In October 1992, the unit's value was modified once
more to $0.0397. In this way, the unit is modified two times a year depending on the
evolution of the Consumer Price Index of the United States. The corresponding rate is
then converted into Argentine pesos (which have been fixed at one for one with the U.S.
dollar since the Convertibility Law was enacted in 1991).
Once the exclusivity period ends the companies shall have the right to renegotiate
the agreements regarding rates and goals with the regulatory authority.23 The interesting
aspect of Section 12.6 is that it states that the regulatory authority shall only control the
rates in those areas of the country in which it deems that real competition does not exist.
This statement raises some questions as to how the regulatory authority defines "real
competition.' This statement should have been more precise in order to avoid unnecessary market interference. If no agreement is reached then rates shall be established by
the regulatory authority and the Ministry of Economy.
5. Sanctions.
The decree provides the following sanctions that may be applied to the service
providers:
(1) Citation.
(2) Fine.
(3) Termination of the right to exclusivity.

23.

S.C. Resolution 1686/99 (October 8, 1999) established that as of October 10, 1999 "full

competition" would begin between four carriers for the provision of local, long distance, and
international telephone service in all of the country.
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(4) Termination of the license. This is the most serious of the four, and it can be
the direct consequence of:
(a) failing to meet the imposed obligations;
(b) partial or total service interruption on a reiterated basis;
(c) change of social object in bylaws or change of domicile to outside of
Argentina;
(d) stock assignment without the previous authorization of the regulatory
agency;
(e) assignment of its license without the previous authorization of the regulatory agency;
(f) reduction of the investment company in the licensee to less than 51 percent
of its stock; or
(g) bankruptcy.
The sanctions are applied by the regulatory authority except for the type stated in
number 4, which is applied by the executive power.
The decree specifically states that the assets related to the provision of the telephone
service cannot be sold, assigned, transferred, or encumbered in any way (section 13.11).
Any exception to this must be previously authorized by the regulatory agency, which
shall evaluate whether the asset is one that the service cannot do without, or whether it
substantially affects its provision.

V.

Structure of the Privatization Transaction.

Each of the two companies' stock was divided into three categories: A, B, and C. The
first type was not transferable due to the fact that it constituted 51 percent of the total
capital, which meant that in effect it represented the control of the company. The class
B stock represented 39 percent of the total and could be transferred. Nine percent of the
B stock went to the licensees and the remaining 30 percent was kept by the government
and sold on the stock market a few months later. The class C stock was to remain for
the companies' personnel in what was established in Decree 62/90 as the "Participated
Property Program."
In May 1990, several international telecommunications firms were interested in the
ex-ENTel privatization. Some of these included: Nynex Corporation, GTE Corporation,
Bell Atlantic, as well as other investment partners. However, the former ENTel was sold
to (with the corresponding temporary exclusive licenses) Telefi6nica de Argentina (in the
south of the country) and Telecom de Argentina-Stet France Telecom (in the north). So
the final privatization process consisted of the 60 percent of stock in the preexisting
companies (Norte S.A. and Sur S.A.) transferred to the new companies in 1990, 10
percent to the employees of the ex-ENTel, and the remaining 30 percent was sold on the
stock market (1992).
As mentioned earlier, the decree established that part of the price-the base pricehad to be paid in cash and the rest in external Argentine debt bonds. This mechanism
had an added advantage for the companies because the bonds could be purchased on
a secondary market at a lower price but their nominal price was recognized by the
government. The government on the other hand would reduce about $5 billion of its
external debt.
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The following chart illustrates the transaction in millions of dollars:

Telef6nica
Telecom
Total
Source: S.C.

Bonds

Cash/Docs

Total

$2.720
$2.308
$5.028

$316
$302
$618

$3.036
$2.610
$5.546

24

We must also take into account the additional funds the government was able
to acquire when it sold its 30 percent in the stock market (December of 1991 for
Telef6nica and early 1992 for Telecom). In this way, the sale of Telef6nica de Argentina's
government-held stock added $830 million dollars to the deal. Another $1.227 billion
came from the sale of Telecom's stock.

Regulatory and Control Authorities.
As stated in the Introduction, the management and assets of ENTel would be transferred to the private sector while the regulation and control of the industry would remain
with the governmental. In this sense "regulation of public services is not a consequence
of its privatization. It should have always existed no matter who was providing the service. Since this was not the case, regulation had to be organized as a matter of urgency
and simultaneously with the privatization of the corresponding sector. 2
Regulation in this industry is of extreme importance in order for it to develop.
Telecommunications is much like other industries in which scarce resources are to be
assigned (i.e., numbers and frequencies). These resources are also constantly undergoing
changes to make them more efficient. This is why on an international level the WTO
has established the "independence of the regulatory entity." In other words, this entity
shall be independent from any service provider and shall not have to answer to it. The
decisions and procedures of the regulatory entity shall be impartial.
Before getting into the specific regulatory agencies created (or modified), a short
reference shall be made to article 42 of the Argentine Constitution (1994 text). This
article gave constitutional support to agencies to ensure the quality and efficiency of
public services (such as telephone service) and to make sure that market competition
was guaranteed. It must be noted, however, that this article was incorporated to the
1994 amendment of the Argentine Constitution. Regulatory agencies in the telephone
This article is important because it is cited in many
industry had already been created.
26
decrees and agency resolutions.
VI.

24.
25.

Secretaria de Comunicaciones, http://www.secom.gov.ar/.
See Guillermo Fanelli Evans, La reforma de la Constituci6n Nacional y los Entes Reguladores;
La Ley 9/3/95.
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The Argentine telephone sector is regulated by:
(1) Secretariade Comunicaciones: this agency existed before the privatization process
under the control of the Ministry of Public Works and Services. Its role is
defined in Presidential Decree 64/190, which assigns it the mission to "regulate,
control and verify public telecommunications services." In 1996, once ENTel
had been privatized, the Ministry (now the Ministry of Economy, Public Works
and Services after an earlier fusion) proposed that the area of communications
should be transferred to the sphere of the "Presidency" and given the rank of
a "Secretaria" (Presidential Decree 245/96). Its main objectives are: to assist the
executive branch in the proposals and policies relating to communications and
its regulation; to generate the telecommunications policies that are necessary to
keep up with this evolving field; cooperate with other agencies in the regulation
of this sector; generate the mechanisms needed to ensure the rights of the users
of the service; and to assist in the resolution of the claims brought against the
decisions of lower ranking regulatory agencies such as the C.N.C. (Presidential
Decree 251/96).
(2) National Communications Commission: this agency was created as a specific
response to the privatization process. The main purpose for its creation was to
centralize the regulation, control, and verification functions into an efficient,
specialized, and independent organ that would ensure the client's rights as well
as the service provider's rights. It should be noted that the original agency
was called the C.N.T. (National Telecommunications Commission) when it was
created in 1990. After a few years the government concluded that the agency
had proved to be inefficient in enforcing the obligations of the carriers under
the exclusivity regime as well as those under the competitive regime. Thus the
C.N.C. was created. Its main functions are: to apply, interpret, and enforce the
decrees and laws regarding the telecommunications industry; to assist the Secretaria de Comunicaciones in elaborating and keeping up to date the technical
telecommunications planning relating to operative compatibility and minimum
quality standards of interconnection; to assist the Secretaria de Comunicaciones
in the enacting of the "reglamentos" (rules) of the different types of telephone
services available; to prevent anti-competitive, monopolistic or discriminatory
conduct such as "non-loyal" subsidies that services in the competitive regimes
receive from the exclusive licenses operators; to ensure the quality and technical compatibility of the public telecommunications network; and to apply the
sanctions established in the corresponding licenses and authorizations.
(3) Legislative Control: the legislative branch also has some control over the industries "players" by way of two bodies:
(a) Auditoria General de la Naci6n: Law 24.156 provides jurisdiction allowing
external control of the acts of the regulatory authorities as well as the obligations (specified in the corresponding contracts) of the private companies
awarded licenses through the privatization procedure.

26.

For example, Decree 264/98.
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(b) Commission on State Reform and Privatization Surveillance: Law 23.696
basically limits to asking for detailed information on any aspect dealing with
privatization and drafting proposals related to the privatized industries.
(4) Executive Control: the President of Argentina has the power under Decree 62/90
to terminate the licenses in the cases previously stated.
(5) Public Hearings: although this does not really constitute a control mechanism
in the literal sense, I have included it due to its importance in granting participation to the relevant parties (as well as the general public) in the early stages
of drafting regulations. This system was implemented (Res. S.C. 57/96) in order
to assure transparency and participation in the decisions regarding the sector.
These hearings are held on matters dealing with technical or regulatory aspects
in the communications area.

VII.

Telecommunications Expansion-Changes in the
Last Ten Years.

As it was stated earlier, one of the government's main goals was to ensure that
the sector would develop by means of direct investments from the companies. These
goals were basically established in the privatization decree's provisions. When the private
companies took over, the total number of telephone lines in Argentina was 3,600,000
(with 3,167,747 in service). This works out to be about twelve lines per every 100 people.
Most experts agree that this was a relatively low number particularly for Argentina's per
capita income. Under the decree, the total number of lines that had to be installed in
the A.M.B.A. northern area was 128,700 by 1993 and 241,200 by 1996; for the southern
A.M.B.A., the numbers were 224,250 by 1993 and 418,600 telephone lines by 1996.
Goals for the overall quality of the service also had to be met. These figures meant
large investments for both providers. However, there were two reasons that made them
inevitable:
(1) The companies had to meet the goals set out by the government in order to be
granted an extension on their exclusive licenses.
(2) Investments would be in their own benefit. They knew that there was an unsatisfied demand for new lines and that investments would be needed to provide additional services (call waiting, answer phone, detailed billing, caller I.D.)
through digitalization of the network.
According to the U.A.D.E., 27 the total amount of investments between both companies reached $15 billion from 1990 to 1997. The Secretaria de Comunicaciones states
that investment for the period 1991-1995 was $10 billion and another $10 billion for the
1996-2000 period. This has enabled Argentina to currently have over 7,500,000 operational telephone lines. By 1995, Argentina's telephone network had 13,000 km of fiber
optic cable added to it. Additionally, the digital out print reached 100 percent for the
northern area and almost 100 percent for the south by 1997.28

27.

Universidad Argentina de ]a Empresa.
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Cellular/mobile communications are under the "competition regime" with two
bands having been assigned for the country. One cellular communications company,
Movicom, had been operating since 1988. In 1992, a second company was licensed
so that some degree of competition would be available. This company, Miniphone, is
jointly owned between Telef6nica and Telecom. Currently the number of subscribers is
about 350,000. In what is known as the "interior" of the country (outside the A.M.B.A.)
a third company has been providing service since 1994. This company is CTI M6vil and
is owned by GTE Mobile and AT&T (among others).
The facts stated above demonstrate that important international telecommunications
companies have been operating in the Argentine market for a number of years. Telef6nica
and Telecom have also been providing cellular service in their areas since 1996 (150,000
subscribers in the interior). Another interesting fact to note is that cellular technology
has enabled rural areas to be connected to the national network in some cases even
before they could access basic telephone service.
All services not under the exclusive regime could be provided under competition.29
Some services had been on a competitive level before 1990, but since deregulation the
government has granted hundreds of licenses for these types of services. This enabled
smaller firms to compete in the telecommunications market. Some of these firms provide services such as Internet access, paging, alarm systems, data transmission, and 600
(900) phone services. These competing industries had made investments during the first
privatization era years that exceeded two billion dollars.
One of the most important changes of the privatization era was known as the
"rebalance of rates." The main reason for this decision had to do with the link between
previous rate regulation and Argentina's past. During many years, Argentina's economy
had been closed and services provided by state-owned monopolies. Cross-subsidization
was common under this model. Consequently, Argentina's international telephone rates
greatly exceeded other countries. Long distance calls increased dramatically after the
240 km mark and ranked among the most expensive in the world. The egregiously
expensive international rates resulted in subsidization of incredibly low local rates that
were far below its actual cost.
Cross-subsidization ended once the markets opened and competition became guaranteed in the medium term. This was established in 1997 by Presidential Decree 92/97.
Long distance and international phone rates fell, which the government viewed as an
extreme benefit in regional and international commerce as well as in improving the
countries' overall competitiveness. Local calls, on the other hand, reflected a rate increase
and some provisions were made so that certain low-income groups would be protected.
This rebalance method also brought about claims because the system of "public hearings" had not been respected before making this decision. However, the Supreme Court
of Argentina determined that the rebalance method was legal and had been executed
30
within the constitutional power vested in the Executive.

28.
29.
30.

Supra note 24.

This was the situation until November 9, 2000.
CSJN (Supreme Court of Argentina), 7/5/98, Defensor del Pueblo c/Estado Nacional-Poder
Ejecutivo Nacional s/amparo ley 16.986.
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The following chart illustrates the level of changes in the sector during the first eight
years of privatization:
Service
Installed Lines
Lines in Service
Number of Public Tel.
Digitalization of Network
Installation Cost
Cost of Pulse
Services Available
New Line Installation Time
Average Repair Time

1990

1998

%

3,631,282
3,167.747
22,549
13,21%
$1,750
$0.06451
26
730 days
(1991)
90 days

8,061,950
7,518.821
107,580
100%
$150
$0.04490
41
15 days

122
137
377
657
-1666
-30
57
4.867
less time
4.500
less time

2 days

3
Source: S.C. '

VIII.

The Start of Local, Long Distance,
and International Deregulation.

In March 1998, Decree 264/98 was enacted and set the basic structure under which
competition would operate. The incumbent licensees were only granted an extension of
two years and not the complete three years that were available. The 1998 decree states
that overall, the investment and quality-expansion goals of the 1990 privatization decree
had been met satisfactorily. However, it also mentions that according to the regulatory
authorities, some parameters (which the decree does not specify) as to the degree of
certain quality standards have not been "completely" met. Because of this a solution was
needed that would uphold the contracts entered into by the government as well as assure
the best interests of the general public. Hence, the partial extension on the exclusive
licenses was granted.32
The decree also states that given the international regulatory experience as well
as the particular structure of the industry in Argentina, the most convenient decision
is that of establishing a "transitional period" that will lead to full competition. Once
this transitional period has ended, a total of four basic telephone service providers shall
have the corresponding licenses to provide service for the whole Argentine territory. So,
two additional licenses shall be granted in addition to the existing ones of Telef6nica
de Espafia and Telecom (which may from that point on provide service in the whole
country). These are the providers that shall compete to offer basic telephone service at
"just and reasonable prices."
31.
32.

Supra note 24.
The extension was for two more years of exclusivity, at the end of which two more licenses
were granted.
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In July 1998, Argentina enacted the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (WTO), Law 25.000, by which it became obligated to completely open
its telecommunications market on November 9, 2000 (this is also stated by Presidential
Decree 465/2000 and Presidential Decree 764/2000). 3
On October 10, 1999, the transitional period came to an end and the four "competitors" that began their interaction in the market
were: Telef6nica de Argentina, Telecom
34
de Argentina, Movicom-BellSouth, and C.T.I.
Although it is really too early to be able to reach a conclusion as to what provider
the consumer will prefer, the following statistics have been included to reflect some initial
data on the situation during the last quarter of 1999. The data was gathered from 5,549
users in the A.M.B.A. area and of fourteen smaller areas in the rest of the country.
According to a recent poll (Julio Aurelio S.A. Agency, October 1999), the company
preferred by the "residential consumer" is Telef6nica de Argentina for long distance
service." When consumers were asked what carrier they would choose once the choice
was available, 39.8 percent responded that they would choose Telef6nica de Argentina,
15.8 percent Telecom, 13 percent Movicom-BellSouth, and 3.9 percent would go with
C.T.I. It is also interesting to point out that 5.7 percent stated that they would choose
any of the carriers and the remaining 21.7 percent were undecided.
In the "commercial consumers" category, 24.1 percent would choose Telef6nica de
Argentina; 13.5 percent picked Telecom, 9.1 percent wanted Movicom-BellSouth, and
2.7 percent for C.T.I.; 24 percent selected "any of the above;' and 26.5 percent "didn't
know at this time."
According to the Julio Aurelio Agency, the most significant aspect of the poll's outcome is that almost 59 percent of Telecom's current users would be willing to change
their provider.
Telef6nica de Argentina states that it has already managed to get 34,000 clients from
its main competitor, Telecom.
As of October 10, 1999, the consumer is able to change his telephone service provider
every two months. The first change is free of charge. After this, the following changes cost
between nine and twelve dollars. But, starting in March 2000, the process is completed
by a simple telephone call that enables the switch.

IX.

Complete Deregulation.

Presidential Decree 465/2000 (June 2000) mandated "full deregulation of the market
beginning on November 9, 2000 for the provision of telecommunications services with no
restrictions and in accordance with the terms of the treaties subscribed by the Argentine

33.
34.

35.

However, it must be noted that the original Decree (62/90) in Section 13.5 had established
October 8, 2000 as the date for total deregulation.
This is the date that was established by S.C. Resolution 1686/99 (October 8, 1999) in which
the transitional period would end and "full competition" would begin between the four
carriers for the provision of local, long distance, and international telephone service in all of
the country.
Diario La Naci6n, October 1999.
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Republic,' 36 thus making it very clear that competition in the telecommunications market
was approaching.
Presidential Decree 764/2000 is the body of law that sets up the legal framework
under which the full competition era began to operate as of November 9, 2000. It also
fulfills Argentina's duties with the WTO to completely open the telecommunications
market. 37 It was enacted under President De ]a Rua's administration and is in tune with
the telecommunications deregulation timeline that had begun with the privatization of
ENTel almost ten years earlier.
One of the main changes that it makes to the system is that it replaces the former
license regime with a single "general license." This type of license is flexible in the
sense that it enables the holder to "provide any type of telecommunication service,
with or without its own infrastructure, in all of Argentina." Broadcasting (which is
governed by Law 22.285, "Ley de Radiodifusi6n") is not included. In this way the decree
reflects the new technologies that enable different types of telecommunication services
to be provided. This type of license shall enable the provider to quickly respond to the
requirements and needs of its clients. In other words, the government wanted to make
sure that the licenses granted would "stand the test of time."
The licenses shall be granted indefinitely (with no fixed time limit) and for all the
Argentine territory as long as the requisites of the decree are met.
The decree has four Annexes: new rules for telecommunication licenses, national
rules on interconnection,38 rules on universal service, and rules on the administration and
control of the spectrum.

X.

Conclusion.

The past ten years have marked radical changes in Argentina's telephone sector. In
1990, the decision of allowing competition in the sector was made. The necessary legal
mechanisms to permit this were created. An inefficient public company was divided and
handed over to two private companies. These companies had the possibility of obtaining
the benefits of a nine-year exclusive license. However, they also had the obligation of
making substantial investments that would improve and extend the service beyond the
nine-year term.
Analysis of the laws, decrees, and relevant economic and factual data reflected in this
presentation lead us to several conclusions. First, the laws and decrees enacted enabled
the privatization. process to be handled in an orderly manner and the timetables for the
different stages were respected from the onset. Second, different carriers were permitted
to provide services such as cellular so that they could establish themselves as possible
candidates once the number of licenses was expanded and the exclusivity period ended.
Third, cross-subsidization was tackled to ensure that competition was fair. Fourth, the
necessary regulatory agencies were created to assure "guidance" to the sector.
36.
37.
38.

The Treaty referred to is the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services;
Argentine Law 25.000.
There are, however, some exceptions dealing with satellite services.
For the complete text of the Decree, see Ministerio de Economia de Argentina, http://www.
infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/ "Decreto 764/2000."
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However, the most important aspect to note is that in less than ten years a massive
restructuring of the industry took place, and it is actually functioning the way it was
originally planned. This fact should be stressed because, in countries such as Argentina,
many projects tend not to be completed. The telephone privatization-deregulation process was different. Argentines now have a choice between four major carriers for their
local, long distance, and international communications. 39 Strong competition during
1999 is reflected by the following graph:
Rates4" of a telephone call
made at 1 p.m. from
Buenos Aires on 12/9/99
Telecom
Telef6nica
Movi.-Bell
C.T.I.

United
States

Cordoba 4

$0.88
$0.83
$0.69
$0.79

$0.57
$0.61
$0.39
-

It is also important to note that some competition in the provision of local telephone
service was already visible in early 2000 as Telecom started to move in to some parts of
42
the country in which Telef6nica de Argentina was the dominant provider: in Caril6,
Bariloche,4 3 and some areas of Caballito.44
These companies are also offering certain programs that bring their rates even lower
(such as selecting a specific country to which the lower rates would apply). This is just
the first step in this era of competition. As new providers begin entering the market (as
of November 2000) the consumer will surely benefit by lower rates and better service. As
of October 2000, thirteen licenses had already been granted to operate local service in the
A.M.B.A. and thirty-two for long distance. Under the general license regime established
by Presidential Decree 764/2000 there have already been over 200 filings for licenses.
It seems amazing that today Argentina possesses one of the most modern telephone
networks in the world when only a decade ago even dialing a local telephone number in
Argentina carried the uncertainty of being able to have a "dial tone."

XI.

Bibliography.

Diario Clarin, 9/5/1999.
Dromi, Roberto. Derecho de las Telecom unicaciones, Ciudad Argentina, 1998.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

This choice is available in limited areas.
These rates do not include the I.V.A. of 21 percent (Argentine value added tax).
C6rdoba is a province located a couple hundred miles from Buenos Aires.
Caril6 is a small coastal town located 450 km from the city of Buenos Aires.
Bariloche is a city in Patagonia located 1650 km from the city of Buenos Aires.
Caballito is an area of the city of Buenos Aires.

